Why does good news have to be tempered by the sort of news that makes one suspect that it may not be good news at all?
It is now anticipated that judge, Lord Philip, who retired from the Scottish bench in 2007, will lead the Independent Review of Evidence into the crash of an RAF Chinook Mk II on the Mull of Kintyre on 2nd June 1994, with the loss of all 29 on board.
This review was announced to widespread welcome by Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, shortly after he took office in the coalition government formed after the general election of May this year (2010).
However, it is now being rumoured that the review is to be held in private.
It may well be that in the fierce internal rearguard action it will undoubtedly have been fighting against Liam Fox’s decision, that the MoD would only ‘agree’ to an independent review if it were to be conducted in private.
In the real world, anyone under suspicion of improper behaviour would never be allowed to have a voice in the nature of an investigation into their actions.
If this review is held in private and if it eventually upholds the Wratten / Day judgment, no one will ever believe it.
The public need to hear all the evidence for themselves so that, whatever the conclusion, they can see where it is coming from. In the end, the only conclusion sure to chime with the by now well informed interested public, is one clearing the pilots of all blame and opening up the performance history of FADEC.
It is the same situation as that obtaining with the Chilcott Inquiry into Britain’s going to war against Iraq in 2003. The only judgment that people will accept as right is one finding Tony Blair guilty of knowingly misleading Parliament and the British people in order to fulfil a promise given personally and earlier to George W Bush.
The Chinook Mk II crash on the Mull of Kintyre on 2nd June 2010
The loss of the 29 lives in this incident would have been catastrophic in any circumstances but was heightened by the fact that 25 of them were high level security and intelligence experts from Northern Ireland, being conveyed to a conference with their ilk at Fort George, east of Inverness.
The enduring controversy over the crash has arisen from a series of conflicting conclusions as to cause drawn by the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
An initial investigation ruled that the causes of the crash could not be established. A subsequent Board of Inquiry by senior RAF officers, Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten and Air Marshal Sir John Day, overruled this verdict and unequivocally pronounced the dead pilots guilty of gross negligence.
This eccentric judgment has never been accepted, not least because there has, from the outset, been concern and evidence – technically presented but effectively withheld from the Wratten /Day Inquiry (with or without their knowledge), that aircraft malfunction was the most likely cause.
The Chinook Mk II had been fitted by Boeing with a new digital engine control system, initially supposed to have an analogue or manual back up in case of software malfunction.
Computer Weekly, a diligent and successful investigator into the performance and monitoring of the software concerned, has shown that, with no resistance from the MoD, Boeing went ahead and installed a digital back up, leaving pilots of the aircraft with no manual override in the case of malfunction.
The name of the software concerned – FADEC – describes the nightmare situation licenced by default by the MoD: Full Authority Digital Engine Control.
‘Full authority’ – the pilots of the Kintyre Chinook had no means of intervening if the software controlling the engine of their aircraft ran amok. The FADEC software had already been shown to be so dangerously unreliable that expert internal advice was that all such flights should be abandoned immediately.
This – and supporting evidence on FADEC’s performance – formed the series of documents placed in a pile of miscellaneous papers that Wratten and Day were unlikely to trouble in the process of their inquiry. And by the MoD’s own account, they did not indeed do so.
The technical availability of these documents to that inquiry, however, has been the mainstay of the MoD’s insistence to the determined campaigners fighting to clear the names of Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook that there was no new evidence to be considered.
The independent review is still welcome but will be tainted with suspicion unless it is held in public. The MoD should not be allowed a veto on this.
In August 200, MoD supplied the following information;
“The Controller Aircraft (CA) who granted an Initial CA Release for the Chinook Mk2 was Sir Donald Spiers. ACAS (Assistant Chief of Air Staffs) was Air Vice Marshal A J C Bagnall”.
The significance of this (question and answer) is that these are the two MoD staffs who signed to say the aircraft was airworthy, despite demonstrably knowing Boscombe Down had condemned the FADEC software as “positively dangerous” (see your report).
It was CA’s job to take heed of Boscombe’s advice and issue his CA Release (CAR), the statement to the RAF that the aircraft was airworthy at the standard presented for CAR Trials.
In turn, ACAS issued his Release to Service (RTS) which is a statement to his RAF users that the aircraft is airworthy at the In Use build standard. (The difference between the two standards is often modifcations which the RAF have incorporated themselves).
Crucially, and to avoid any subsequent complaint by the RAF that they didn’t know of problems (such as dangerous software), the regulations require CA to offer his proposed CAR to ACAS before signature. By following this regulation, nothing comes as a surprise to the RAF (such as being landed with dangerous software). That is, the RAF (in the form of AVM Bagnall) cannot claim ignorance of the problem.
I hope this explains some of the more obscure background detail. I also hope that, given this insight, both Spiers and Bagnall are interviewed during the forthcoming review. They were NOT interviewed at the time; an astonishing oversight.
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For Michael Armitage: Thank you for this very useful information and procedural insight. We assume that you will already have taken steps to bring this to the attention of relevant quarters in relation to the coming review. FYI we have now channelled this information, verbatim, to the Secretary of State for Defence. It is clearly important that the review takes cognisance of the evidence of these two men.
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Further to the most informative points raised by Michael Armitage which make compelling reading and for additional background information, see Addendum 4 on Chinook HC2 Airworthiness during 1993/94, leading to the Mull of Kintyre accident on 2 June 1994. The addendum on HC2 Airworthiness, or lack thereof, was added to the ‘Macdonald Report’ in early 2010 after further research and following release of documents through the Freeedom of Information Act. The original report , by three past chairmen of the Royal Aeronautical Society Flight Operations Group, was issued privately in April 2000 with its three addendums. It may be found on
http://sites.google.com/site/heathwaypilot/home in ‘Chinook revisited’ where the Tench report may also be found.
The Tench report is the Report of study of aircraft accident investigation procedures in the Armed Services by W H Tench, January 1987 (Then Head of the Civil Accident Investigation Branch). It was never implemented because of its political sensitivity.
In addition, the obvious lack of airworthiness process and compliance regarding the Chinook Mk2 can be seen in the non-compliance matrix at the formative website of one of the team’s researchers: https://sites.google.com/site/chinookdown/compliance-matrix
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For Captain Ralph Kohn: And thank for this additionally useful information. It becomes progressively clearer that there is a critical mass of material attesting to the know and demonstrated lack of airworthiness of the Chinook Mk II. We have again arranged for this information to be channelled to the Secretary of State for Defence in relation to the independent review of evidence on the incident.
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Thank you Newsroom
I can confirm that Dr Fox, and his Labour predecessors, have been sent personal copies of this information. If you read the 2nd link provided by Ralph Kohn, you will see these points in far greater detail.
I do not seek to make political capital from this fact – after all, the underlying problems occurred under a Tory Government. It is senior MoD staffs, and RAF officers in particular, who have provided the continuity and presented the dead bat to every attempt at justice. If you want to see which officers, simply search for and read the correspondence to the press in January this year, which they wrote in response to the BBC publishing the “positively dangerous” letter.
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The following letter in response to that of the 5 Air Marshals was not published by the DT at the time. You may agree to air it even now, however late, to show the lack of impartiality demonstrated by some of the press by denying the right to respond, as in this case:
The CHINOOK ACCIDENT REVIEW – Letter in the Daily Telegraph on 14 January 2010
I beg to offer the following in response
Captain Ralph Kohn FRAeS
MULL OF KINTYRE REVIEW
Five RAF Air Chief Marshals indicated they would welcome the opportunity to, quote: “… explain precisely why it (the verdict) cannot be overturned by recourse to a hypothesis for which there is no evidence and which is revealed as wholly implausible when tested against known facts”, unquote. (DT 14 January – Chinook accident review).
We welcome the Air Chief Marshals having a chance to make their points to Ministers (before an independent Judge) as part of a new Inquiry, provided that all available evidence is heard this time. That would, of course, include previously withheld evidence about MoD’s failure to implement airworthiness regulations; the same failings highlighted last year by the Haddon-Cave report.
The unanswered questions are, why were the pilots charged with Gross Negligence based upon pure supposition with no actual facts by the two senior reviewing officers, who overturned the RAF’s own Board of Inquiry that could not apportion blame; and why was the aircraft released to Service whilst still not fully Airworthy.
We look forward with interest to hearing those responsible explain their actions.
Captain Ralph Kohn, Captain Ron Macdonald and Captain Richard K J Hadlow, Compiler and co-authors of the Macdonald Report (April 2000 & January 2010 Addendum 4 on Airworthiness).
This seems indicative of pressure being applied to air only one side of the story, due to the continued sensitivity of this case.
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For Captain Ralph Kohn and Michael Armitage:: The concept of ‘blind justice’ is one from which we have long been separated and to which we need to return to restore public confidence in and the credibility of the judicial system.
What is evident in both of your contributions is that there are outstanding specific and serious questions which any genuinely objective investigation into the background causes of this incident cannot, with any integrity, fail to explore fully – and be enabled to do so.
The reason for the enduring concern over this case is the extent to which it appears that vested interests have – effectively with licence to do so – concealed evidence, obstructed the compilation of a full and accurate information bank to feed a secure situation analysis – and shown a flagrant disregard for natural justice in placing so serious a judgment as gross negligence against the records of the two pilots, gagged by death – with no evidence to support that judgment except the bare fact that the aircraft crashed.
In our view, the 16 year-old shelter from investigation of many aspects of this case has bred so profound a public distrust of the blind independence of the judicial system that nothing other than a public review of the evidence will suffice.
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Newsroom: Your help in achieving such a public review to clear the sullied name of the RAF after such a shameful display of deceit and connivance to deflect attention from the real cause of the problem, would be a positive move. It would also lend support to get the accusation of Gross Negligence against the pilots overthrown.
The MoD should now take account of the uncovered evidence on Airworthiness deficiencies that it has ignored in the past and continues to deny, to wit, lack of attention to Chinook Mark 2 Airworthiness matters at the time of its introduction into Service.
Had Haddon-Cave QC, investigated RAF Airworthiness issues earlier than 1999, he would have brought to light the Chinook scandal, together with all the other deficient Airworthiness problems that resulted in a series of accidents identified by his inquiry; and possibly more.
May I leave it to you to spread the word and make contacts that you feel could be of help. Thank you for your encouraging words.
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Since retiring from flying as a pilot in both the Royal Air Force and the Civil Airlines I have become increasingly alarmed at discovering the depths to which UK Military Airworthiness had sunk since I left the Service in 1973. As has been described by the preceding contributors this matter has already been reported on by the Nimrod Review, following the deaths of 14 servicemen in that tragedy. However it did not refer back as far as 1994, when an even greater tragedy occurred on the Mull of Kintyre. 29 people perished that day in a Chinook HC2. It is now known that the type, then very recently Released To Service into RAF Squadrons, had numerous Airworthiness Deficiencies, to the extent that the aircraft being tested at Boscombe Down were grounded by them. No such action occurred on the squadrons however and sadly ZD576 crashed. No mention of this prelude to the accident was mentioned by the Board of Inquiry, nor by the Air Officer Commanding in his Finding, which notoriously held the pilots to have been grossly negligent despite any convincing evidence to that effect. I suspect though that the Finding was right, that there was indeed gross negligence, it was simply found against the wrong people.
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Pingback: Kintyre Chinook Pilots may yet be cleared
The whole thing stinks and the announcement that the latest enquiry is to be in private does not instill confidence.
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We have just reported – http://forargyll.com/2010/08/jim-mather-acts-on-private-hearing-of-independent-review-of-evidence-on-1994-kintyre-crash-of-chinook-mk2/ – action on this matter by Jim Mather, Scottish Government Minister for Enterprise, Energy and Tourism and Argyll’s MSP.
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Excellent news. Well done Mr Mather.
Newsroom – would you have a contact address for Mr Mather? I’d like to send him information which is already with Mr Robertson.
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For Michael Armitage: If you care to send us the information you wish to pass on to Mr Mather, we will undertake to forward it to him – which will then give him your email address.
If this is helpful to you, please use the ‘Contact Us’ email form – found at the very top right hand of this page, above the banner.
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Pingback: Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged - Page 337 - PPRuNe Forums)
Nick Clegg today announced an independent review, to be undertaken by a barrister; which differs somewhat from the previous announcement that Lord Philip would conduct it.
Nevertheless, one hopes he is tasked with assessing ALL the evidence, not just that which received a casual glance in 1994 or, very importantly, that which was suppressed by ordering the senior test pilot not to speak.
In particular of course, he must assess the impact of the Assistant Chief of the Air Staffs stating (to the RAF) the aircraft was airworthy, but at the same time withholding the fact that MoD’s own airworthiness experts at Boscombe Down had stated, categorically, it was NOT airworthy. That, in fact, the Safety Critical Software that managed the engine fuel computers was “positively dangerous”.
This act of omission is a very serious offence.
To quote Hansard “ACAS was Air Vice Marshal A J C Bagnall”.
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Members of the Review are “confirmed” as;
Lord Philip (retired Lord of Session)
Baroness Liddell of Clydeside (Lab)
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)
Malcolm Bruce MP (Lib/Dem)
I would be most grateful if Newsdesk or any interested party would post any contact details or relevant information on these learned persons.
Thank you
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For Michael Armitage: We published an article on 16th September on Dr Fox’s naming the members of the Review Panel – and giving the information you are looking for. http://forargyll.com/2010/09/defence-secretary-names-review-panel-for-1994-chinook-mk2-crash-in-kintyre/
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Newsroom.
Thank you. I have sent an e-mail. However, I’d like to comment on one paragraph of your article. You said;
The Chinook Mk2 crashed in thick fog on the hillside near Machrihanish Lighthouse on the Mull of Kintyre. From the wreckage, it had clearly crashed at considerable speed.
To use the term “thick fog” lends credence to the OPINION of the Reviewing Officers (Wratten and Day) but ignores the factual evidence of two important first hand witnesses.
But, first, one must understand one thing. No-one knows what the pilots were seeing out the cockpit window. There was no Cockpit Voice Recorder to record any converstaion about the weather. The aircraft did not have a Weather/Collision Avoidance Radar or Forward Looking Imaging device which would be the only possible electronic sources of such information – even if it had a recorder to capture the data, which even fewer aircraft have.
Back to the witnesses. A yachtsman gave evidence that he saw the sun glinting off the cockpit windows as it passed overhead approaching the Mull. He could see the lighthouse.
Secondly, a witness on the Mull, at the precise time of impact, stated she saw the immediate aftermath (wreckage being thrown) from “500 yards away across the hill”. Another witness in a different position also talked in terms of hundreds of yards.
What MoD like to quote, disingeniously and in isolation, is other statements that mention thick fog.
A fair minded view would be to admit localised ground hugging fog/mist, but not the all encompassing fog extending well out to sea that Wratten and Day claim to have evidence of. Remember, they presented an infamous diagram to the House of Lords showing the aircraft entering fog while some way short of landfall. The Lords rejected their evidence.
Finally, on the “considerable speed” statement, MoD similarly claim the aircraft was going too fast. Now, it may sound flippant, but aircraft do tend to zip along. However, analysis of what little evidence remains (time of departure, time of arrival at a Waypoint, distance travelled) means you can easily calculate the average speed from Aldergrove to just short of the Mull. This was, by some way, lower than the aircraft capabilities and commensurate with a passenger flight, because the Chinook got very uncomfortable due to vibration levels at higher speeds. (In fact, this is another area where MoD have deceived, as they claim the “new” Mk2 Chinook had less vibration, yet the MoD’s own airworthiness experts reported that there had been no change from the Mk1, and vibration was very bad). However, the speed at impact was, apparently (but not conclusively) higher than the average, which is where theory about the sudden surge in speed comes from. I’ll try to avoid technicalities, but the uncertainty arises from the fact that there is no continious timeline – the Navigation computer only took samples every so often, so one cannot know for certain when, during the flight, speed increased or decreased.
I’d be very grateful if this clarification could be used in any subsequent pieces. Presenting this MoD argument as fact is (unintentionally) misleading and actually supports MoD’s opinion.
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For Michael Armitage: Thank you for this forensic clarification. We were clearly casual in the use of the term ‘thick fog’ – and indeed, from this material, would have been similarly casual in any statement of weather conditions.
It is clearly germane that visibility may not have been impeded.
We would wish now to recognise the force of the implications of the witness statements to which you refer and to ensure that in future articles we apply this perspective.
With regard to speed at point of impact: of course average speed can be calculated from available objective facts of departure times, waymark time, impact time – but average speed, as you say, may not necessarily have applied immediately before impact and there was no flight data record.
We are honest researchers and logicians but obviously far from expert in this field. We have, rightly or wrongly, come to understand that one of the rogue charateristics of FADEC was sudden, spontaneous acceleration which, without manual override, pilots could not control.
So, if the physical evidence at the crash site suggested a speed higher than would have been expected, it would logically indicate malfunction and not pilot error – whatever the visibility?
If visibility was poor, it is inconceivable that, in such circumstances, the pilot would have gunned the engine of an aircraft in whose control system neither flight lieutenant had confidence.
If visibility was good, the pilot would have seen the height of the hill and the aircraft’s relationship to the contours of the hill. Again, in such circumstances, it is inconceivable that the pilot would have initiated inappropriate speed – and the vibration discomfort for passengers which you evidence would clearly have been a major factor for the pilots, given the rank of the passengers in question.
In general, with at least one of the two pilots known to have been resistant to flying that aircraft on the day and with the awareness among the pilots of the Chinook Mk 2 of the FADEC system’s serious unreliability, it is unimaginable that the concentration of the pilots during every second of flying time would not have been at its peak.
They must have been ready for trouble at any moment.
As you say, though, an out of control aircraft flying directly into a hill at any speed will experience an impact from which survival is improbable.
The key thing is that, of all of the probable causes of the accident, the least probable of all in the circumstances has always been pilot error. The Wratten/Day conclusions were indefensibly – irresponsibly – simplistic in their basis.
As we now know,they were also, knowingly or unknowingly, underinformed on the state of awareness at the time of the serious problems with FADEC and the qualified recommendation that the Chinook Mk2s in which it was fitted should immediately be removed from service.
This recommendation had, of course, been lodged and known prior to the insistence on using this aircraft for this flight.
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Newsroom
Many thanks. I agree entirely.
What I would add is this. There were a plethora of known problems with the new aircraft for which the solution, or action to take, was not fully understood in June 1994. That is one reason why the pilots asked to use the older Mk1.
These uncertainties, and the distractions they cause, are termed Human Factors Hazards. There were too many on the Mk2 to be deemed tolerable.
While the FADEC may have caused a “surge”, what was definitely known is that the Mk2 suffered from Undemanded Flight Control Movements (UFCM). Specifically, at the end of a straight run (e.g. Aldergrove to the Mull) the act of trying to change direction would cause sudden, violent movements and the aircraft would, typically, jump right and down. This was notified by the RAF’s senior Chinook test pilot in late 93 and early 94, but he was actively prevented from giving evidence. He has consistently stated that the only reason he regained control before crashing (on more than one occasion) was the fact he had sufficient altitude and experience – something the Mull pilots were denied. For 15 years MoD have denied what he said, but the written proof he was right has only just emerged, in the form of a signal from Bosocmbe Down dated 28th February 1994. When shown this signal, the test pilot stated he had never seen it – ever; and not had oher crews in Northern Ireland even some montsh after the crash.
I am not a pilot, but am tempted to ask this leading question. If the pilots had been told that, when attempting the required turn left, to Corran, the aircraft may dip right and down, would they have chosen a different Waypoint that would have given them a larger safety margin in the event of a problem i.e. further out to sea with more time to recover? This is mere speculatuion, but I believe valid. The point is, I don’t have to prove this, merely highlight the fact it raises doubt. And if there is any doubt, then they were not grossly negligent.
Does this sound like an aircraft one would want to fly 25 VVIP passengers in? Of course not. The pilots didn’t want to fly it themselves, never mind with passengers.
If I may return to FADEC. The electronic part is termed DECU, one for each engine. Incredibly, insanely, the aircrewman was under orders to check the security of electrical connectors on both DECUs every 15 minutes. Imagine you’re on your holiday flight and you see the crew fiddling with plugs and sockets every 15 mins. You’d be pretty nervous. What if the connector came loose when it was being checked? Oh, that’s ok, only one engine will be affected. But wait, not only are the connectors on the DECU unfit for purpose, but this is the box with the “positively dangerous” software in it.
Conclusion – The aircraft should not have been flying and those who signed to say it was airworthy are not worthy of the uniform they wore.
I sincerely hope the 4 members of the Review give this evidence a fair hearing. Meanwhile, thank you for your support, especially on a sad day when another two lives have been lost in Afghanistan.
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I would appreciate if someone representing the Pilot/Co Pilot’s family would may contact with me or alternatively someone who is behind the new inquiry acting on their behalf.
Please contact this blog and hopefully they will give you my email address.
I am ex aviation operations and would like to pass you some information
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For Peter Eyre: We have passed your message and email address to a contact you should find very useful and who will be interested to hear from you.
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Sorry I made a small mistake in the text of my message if the moderator can correct it as follows:
I was to soon find out that I knew one of the leading guys Ralph Know from my early days in British Midland and so It was my preference to track him down and explain what I had learnt and what I intended to do…….Ralph was somewhat shocked and agreed that this aspect had not be looked at and so the following communication took place……
It should read I was to soon find out that I knew on of the leading guys Ralph Kohn……can you correct please…..sorry
Peter Eyre
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The last 48 hours have been extremely tense for both myself and my friend which I would now like to share with you all. First of all I am shocked that no one has ever considered or investigated that this accident was an inside job and in that context there can be no excuse. Also having been involved in airline and VIP aviation security I also find it incredible that every rule in the book was violated in allowing such a large group of high level security experts to travel on one flight…this remains a no no in both the Royal Family, Military and certainly in the Corporate CEO/Director sense etc. Add the two suggestion together and you have the making of what some would call a “Conspiracy off all times.”
As a result of my own military,aviation, corporate experience with some Intel connections I would like to share a conversation I had with an ex Intel Operative some time ago which caused me to pass details of that conversation to my friend who has a similar background.
After looking at the ZD576 accident and inquiry I found it hard to believe that all avenues had not been exhausted and so I commenced my own investigation to look for the many loopholes that came out of this inquiry and the blatant way Senior RAF staff blamed the crew.
Having worked with a leading world helicopter company and a leading airline I found, as an operational expert (with good met knowledge) some very serious flaws. I also noticed a clash between the evidence supplied by the civilian inquiry compared to the rather bias report from the military.
The weather was what one could call a typical British early summers day. However having been involved in SAR the day was perfectly operational for the task on hand and certainly ok from the military perspective.
Forward visibility was fine and the normal type of coastal activity as one normally encounters around the coastal fringe was also normal ie hill tops shrouded in cloud with a constant undulating cloud base in and around many locations.
As the guy in the boat stated he could almost make out the Antrim Coastline and clearly saw the approaching chopper etc etc.
I dont think the cross examination of the onshore witnesses was totally sound and the military took advantage of this aspect to manipulate their way of thinking……there were many many grey areas that need revisiting.
Back to my aspect…….after convincing myself that this was not pilot error I then discussed with my friend the contents of my phone conversation again and we talked through it…..the verdict that we both had a duty of care to report this phone call to the police and also make it known to the people that were involved in the original inquiry.
I was to soon find out that I knew one of the leading guys Ralph Know from my early days in British Midland and so It was my preference to track him down and explain what I had learnt and what I intended to do…….Ralph was somewhat shocked and agreed that this aspect had not be looked at and so the following communication took place……
(Editor’s note” For Argyll has removed reproductions of emails here – as the full addresses to which they were sent were given and we had no information on whether or not the recipients were happy to have this information made public.)
I can assure you that both myself and my friend are both professionals, both ex military and both with a very sound background. I also ask the question why would two two mature men with our background go and lodge an incident report with the police. For two very good reasons. 1…to report something that may or may not be true 2.. for our own protection.
So there you have it……no doubt this web and PPRUNE will be very much alive with the latest buzz now…..either way this operative has to appear before a court regarding the comments made to me be they true or false. This important aspect also need to be considered by the investigation board and one should ask the question why was this aspect not considered?
Peter Eyre
Ex Senior Airline/Helicopter Operations Staff, SAR Coordinator and Aviation Consultant
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In order to comply with journalism protocol I have decided to reprint yesterdays event in full with the emails addresses removed. My first response was to contact the compiler of the civilian report re Chinook ZD576. I discussed with him on the phone the contents of a phone call I had received on the 4th of August 2010 and then after this initial introduction I sent the following emails:
Re Chinook ZD576
Thursday, 7 October, 2010 12:40
From: Peter Eyre
To Members of the team involved in the Chinook inquiry
Hello again
I have been speaking with my friend who was the person I discussed my telephone conversion with concerning the call I had previously made (some time ago) to an ex Intel Operative.
My friend who is also ex RAF asked me what information I had found out about the crash and the circumstances, to which I replied, that there were so many grey areas that certainly did not make sense.
I went through everything with him (he knows that I will not make a statement until I myself am satisfied that something is deeply suspect)……he then reflected on my conversation with the Intel Operative and said that I am obliged to report this to the police.
Since my chat with him last night and more investigations I again rang him to be a witness to what I have been doing both in the past and up to the current time and likewise I do the same for him……..because the issues we both deal in are highly sensitive we have to do this for our own protection.
I have just been in touch with him at 1210 today and we will both go to the Police Station today to lodge a statement regarding my chat with this Intel Operative that if true implicates the authorities to this being an inside job. Either way we already know that the only reason this Chinook could have crashed was by some catastrophic event taking place at Waypoint A rendering the crew unable to correct what was happening to them.
So my conclusion is one of two events took place
1. The aircraft systems failed catastrophically and the crew were unable to override the problem manually resulting in the crash.
Or
2. If my conversation with the Intel operative is correct then the aircraft was tampered with, controlled by and arranged by a Government Agency who deliberately wanted the passengers onboard this Chinook removed. It was explained that some of those deceased may not have been moving the peace talks along the way the Government wanted and so such things can happen. The operative actually told me that the Chinook Incident was done from the operative’s office.
This caused me deep concern, knowing that the deceased crew and their families had gone through hell in trying to clear them of neglect etc.
The phone call in question occurred on Wednesday the 4th of August 2010 and spread over a period of late morning to early afternoon. Soon after this I contacted the informant and thanked for the chat etc.
It has taken me some time to not only come to terms with this conversation but also the facts that this is high risk for me and those involved. I already am dealing in some very sensitive areas and this just adds more fuel to the existing fire and the associated risks.
For my part I also had to go through the whole incident in my own mind to see if I could convince myself that the accident to Chinook ZD576 was certainly not crew error.
As an ex aviation professional in Airline Operations, Flight Planning, Search and Rescue and also having worked for Bristow Helicopters in an ATC/SAR role I am now convinced that either of the above two were responsible for this accident.
I will get back to you all after I have been to the local police and I will have my friend with me as a witness to the event.
Would you all please acknowledge receipt of this email just in case something should happen to me or my friend?
Best Regards
Peter Eyre
I did receive acknowledgement from Captain Ralph Kohn but he explained the others may be away somewhere else.
Since the above email was sent to I and my friend have reported some of the above in order to have it registered with the police…..however I am still waiting for an interview but at least the process has been started….below is my email to Ralph re that visit:
From Peter Eyre
To the group
Hello Gentlemen
Myself and my friend Gordon Bowden (Ex RAF) went to Derby Police HQ, St Mary’s Wharf, Derby today to give information in relation to my email to you concerning the information I received over the phone ref the Chinook being an inside job.
The police first interviewed Gordon Bowden who gave them an overall picture as to what he and I are doing on a broad range of issues.
Gordon then told them about the telephone conversation I had with an Ex Government Intel Operative and what that person said to me regarding the above accident and that I had then rung Gordon to discussed the conversation with him.
The basic interview the Derby Police had with Gordon Bowden was given an incident number of 620 dated 07/10/2010.
When my turn came they did not have enough time to interview me and said they would arrange for myself and Gordon to have an official recorded interview (which we had first requested) another day. They said they would be in touch by Monday to arrange this.
The general mannerism of the Police was rather strange in that the focus of Gordon’s interview was on other matters with only a short period of time focusing on the real reason we had come to the Police Stationblank (to report the conversation with the operative).
I was the only person who actually spoke with the operative and yet I was not interviewed, despite the fact that we had told them that this had to be recorded for our own protection.
The officer advised the fact that we were on CCTV when we came in and that was sufficient evidence of our attendance. The fact that Gordon received an incident number is proof that this initial discussion has now been officially reported
We both felt a little deflated based on the information we were trying to hand over and felt a general reluctance by the police to become involved in this report.
I would ask any aviators if they would be kind enough to put this up on the PPRUNE webpage.
Thank You
Peter Eyre 1845 8/10/2010
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First of all, a Merry Xmas to all readers.
I thought it would be worthwhile posting an update.
The Lord Philip Review has commenced and continues apace. The Review’s terms permit it to go deeper than previous reviews (which you will recall still cleared the pilots). This is making MoD nervous because they are being asked questions which they studiously avoided during the original Board of Inquiry.
This has not prevented them continuing to deny the existence or possession of key documents but the difference this time is that the Review is actively seeking and receiving copies from other MoD sources. That is, when any request is made of MoD, it is normally dealt with by a team which is ordered to toe the party line. In the past, this team’s replies have been accepted at face value, but following the experiences of the Nimrod and Hercules Coroners’ Inquests (when MoD lies were exposed in Court) it seems the Review is pursuing unofficial channels and having some success acquiring these non-existent documents.
One example of the issues being raised in here;
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/39182-chinook-still-hitting-back-3-merged-743.html (at post #7426)
To summarise this single post, the Board of Inquiry were duty bound to consider the possibility of an underlying “Organisational Fault”. They did not. The poster postulates this was under direction from senior officers. Right or wrong, his point about the Board’s report not once mentioning “negligence” or “airworthiness” is perfectly valid and constitutes an extraordinary omission and failure of duty. This is important, because the existence of such an “Organisational Fault” is exactly what the Haddon-Cave report is all about; in that case, a systemic failure to implement airworthiness regulations. Who benefits from such an omission?
This in turn raises a question which Lord Philip has been asked to consider. If senior officers were deemed to have contributed to an Organisational Fault, could a verdict of gross negligence be sustained? (In my opinion) of course not, because such a verdict required proof beyond any doubt whatsoever; and such a high level failure would introduce doubt. Also, please consider this. The officers who handed down the gross negligence verdict and their supporters (primarily retired senior officers of the day) were part of the cadre responsible for Organisation Fault. Not only on Chinook. At their level, their actions affect all aircraft, so they can be seen to be major contributors to the problems exposed by Haddon-Cave.
This plethora of “new” evidence (it is not new as such, but it was not made available before now) is believed to be one reason why Lord Philip has sought a 6 month extension, with mid-2011 now his target. This would suggest that not only has Lord Philip been informed of such failings, but this time hard factual evidence has been produced which MoD can no longer simply dismiss as hearsay.
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New evidence (in that MoD withheld it for 20 years) has come to light that Chinook crashes PRIOR to that on the Mull of Kintyre were solely attributable to airworthiness failings on the part of MoD.
This is sourced from an internal RAF report initiated after the loss of a Chinook on the Falkland Islands in 1987 (multiple fatalities).
It is not known why MoD chose to withhold the report, the content of which is sufficient to cast very serious doubt on the MoK verdict against the pilots.
But MoD’s actions and subsequent written assurances by numerous RAF officers and officials that there were no such problems is an offence under the Air Force Act 1955, Part 2, Sections 29A, 60 and 62; and carries a punishment of up to two years imprisonment.
More to come.
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For Michael Armitage: It seems odd to describe something so shocking as ‘good news’ but surely this will establish a willingness to conceal as well as testify to airworthiness problems?
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Hope you all saw the news yesterday.
The only thing MoD had to say for themselves was that the 1992 report applied to Chinook Mk1, not Mk2.
The report mentions Mk2 over 40 times!
If that is the best they can come up with, God help our armed forces. Time to rid MoD of these disingenuous, dissembling liars who so willingly place lives at risk.
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Mark
Thank you for this.
Would you care to factor in the FACT that the aircraft was known to suffer from Undemanded Flight Control Movements, which manifested themselves thus; At the end of a long straight and level run with little control input necessary (Aldergrove to Mull of Kintyre for example), an attempt to turn would result in sharp yaw movement in the opposite direction and downwards, accompanied by violent shuddering making the reading of instruments very difficult. In fact, the perfect description of what few facts we know about what happened in the final seconds.
You may care to speculate why MoD withheld that information from aircrew, only for it to occur, yet again, to an Aldergrove Chinook shortly after the crash.
And why all the above was withheld from the Board of Inquiry.
And why the Board of Inquiry was not informed the aircraft was not cleared to fly, in accordance with MoD’s own regulations; it’s status at the time being little more than an aircraft with only experimental flight approval.
And then, given these facts, why MoD still insist these critical technical and procedural failures do not constitute “doubt”, when the legal test is “beyond any doubt whatsoever”.
I don’t think the Lord Philip or his colleagues will have been impressed with any of the above. Or with those who failed in their duty of care by allowing, nay insisting, that these regulations be broken.
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I put a submission into the original inquiry. I was on holiday in Kintyre in August 1995 a couple of months after the Chinook helicopter disaster. I stated that my wife and I were at the Mull of Kintyre car park and the weather conditions were light showers of rain and thick fog rolling in, with occasional glimpses of sunlight shining on the sea between the showers. I remarked to my wife that if a Chinook helicopter had flown in these conditions that day it could have been in sunshine and then suddenly in thick fog and rain. However the original Board of Inquiry chose to disregard my submissions.
I also sent a fax to the Defence Minster at that time Doug Henderson who also disregarded my submissions. Doug Henderson unfortunately retired at the election in 2010 and is now living in Anstruther Fife.
That is a pity as I was hoping to send him an email after yesterday’s verdict and I was going “to nail him” about his original reply to me.
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